Patterns in the top-level .gitignore match in all subdirectories, so
there's no need to repeat ourselves quite so much for generic
C, Autotools and gcov patterns.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
test/dbus-daemon: Mark max-connections-per-user as unimplemented on Windows
See merge request dbus/dbus!54
Reviewed-by: pwithnall
Reviewed-by: rhabacker
This saves around 32% of the size of the archive.
[smcv: Rebased onto current master]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107630
nonce-tcp isn't really any more secure than tcp, unless you are
using ANONYMOUS authentication, which should not be considered
secure in any case. Avoid the word "secured" so that people don't
get the wrong idea.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
This might (?) have made sense behind a firewall in 2003; but now it's
2018, the typical threat model that we are defending against has
changed from "vandals want to feel proud of their l33t skills"
to "organised crime wants your money", and a "trusted" local LAN
probably contains an obsolete phone, tablet, games console or
Internet-of-Things-enabled toaster with remote root exploits.
This make network topologies that used to be acceptable look
increasingly irresponsible.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
This is the default, and blocks TCP-based attacks by making the
attacker fail to authenticate (while also preventing inadvisable
TCP-based configurations from working).
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
I'm far from convinced that this option should even *exist*, but it
should definitely be documented as a very bad thing.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: Add a TODO comment as suggested]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
With some fairly reasonable threat models (active or passive local
attacker able to eavesdrop on the network link, confidential
information being transferred via D-Bus), secure authentication is
insufficient to make this transport secure: it does not protect
confidentiality or integrity either.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Like the normal TCP transport, it has no confidentiality or integrity
protection. The only difference is that it adds an extra layer of
authentication.
However, this extra authentication is easily defeated if an attacker
could be eavesdropping on the link between client and server (unlike
DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1, which for all its flaws does at least protect the
confidentiality of the magic cookie).
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106004
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Ralf Habacker <ralf.habacker@freenet.de>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
The old version-1 format is deprecated and now produces warnings.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106186
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: Add the .devhelp2 file to .gitignore as suggested]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
The tutorial is not necessarily a great entry point for the libdbus
documentation: it's infrequently updated, and we should probably have
the "If you use this low-level API directly, you're signing up for some
pain" message from the API reference show up in devhelp more immediately.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106186
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: Add longer commit message with rationale]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Newer versions of yelp-build use this instead of a jQuery syntax
highlighter.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106171
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: Also add it to .gitignore as suggested]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
This is an interpretation of the existing text. There are two plausible
ways a relaying server could interpret "must ignore [new] fields":
it could pass them through as-is, or it could delete them before
relaying. Until now, the reference implementation has done the former.
However, this behaviour is difficult to defend. If a server relays
messages without filtering out header fields that it doesn't
understand, then a client can't know whether the header field was
supplied by the server, or whether it was supplied by a (possibly
malicious) fellow client.
We can't introduce useful round-trip-reducing header fields like
SENDER_UNIX_USER_ID or SENDER_LINUX_SECURITY_LABEL until the
message bus filters them out, *and* provides a way for clients to
know for sure that it has done so. This is a step towards that
feature.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100317
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
The Telepathy "Tubes" APIs are an example of a server that is not a
message bus, but makes use of the sender and destination fields to
provide broadly unique-connection-name-like semantics.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100317
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
These are defined by standard RFCs rather than by D-Bus. What
separates them from other standard mechanisms like PLAIN (RFC 4616)
is that in practice, D-Bus implementations support EXTERNAL,
DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 and sometimes ANONYMOUS, but not PLAIN.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
We don't need to invent a MAGIC_COOKIE mechanism when we have a
perfectly good EXTERNAL.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
The SASL RFC requires that we do this. I had previously thought that
the D-Bus protocol on Unix requires the use of numeric user IDs,
but in fact the reference implementation will also accept usernames.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
The examples don't include an explanation, but the reference
implementation always sends the human-readable explanation, in both
directions.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
Client-to-server auth commands expect a reply, whereas
server-to-client auth commands don't (the client is expected to send
another command that is valid in the new state, but it isn't really
a direct reply to the server-to-client command).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
Having the text about the message stream in the documentation
of AUTH seemed rather odd, and made it likely to get out of sync
with the rest of the spec. Move it to the BEGIN section, remove
some duplication, and make it clearer that if the client pipelines
the fd-negotiation, the server is expected to send exactly one
reply per non-BEGIN command before switching to the D-Bus wire protocol.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
This was (hopefully) implicit in the protocol descriptions, but we
never actually said it. Do so.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=104224
This reverts commit 39262d0a29.
I'm reasonably sure the API for Container1 is going to change
incompatibly, so it isn't ready to be in the published spec yet.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
We don't really need two parallel forms of punctuation, and in
particular DNS domain names only have one (hyphens). If we choose one
representation and deprecate the other, it makes the recommendation
clearer for app authors.
This reflects a similar change to the Desktop Entry Specification,
which uses D-Bus well-known names as app IDs. While hyphens are not a
problem for D-Bus well-known names or for freedesktop.org app IDs,
they create problems for adjacent APIs and specifications that want to
use a well-known name in a context where hyphens are not allowed.
Hyphens are not allowed in D-Bus object paths and interface names,
are only conditionally allowed in Flatpak app IDs (they can only
appear in the last element), and have a special syntactic role in
Freedesktop icon names.
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103216
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103914
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Larsson <alexl@redhat.com>
These will be enforced in subsequent commits.
Reviewed-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
[smcv: Fix whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101354
