xserver/test/pyxtest/test_xi.py
Peter Hutterer fea5cc4b54 pyxtest: add tests for XI property and passive grab CVEs
Commit 541ab2ecd4 ("Xi/randr: fix handling of PropModeAppend/Prepend")
Commit 8f454b793e ("Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of ProcXIChangeProperty")
Commit 51eb63b0ee ("Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255")

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-claude-opus-4-6
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2187>
2026-05-10 23:42:43 +00:00

238 lines
8.8 KiB
Python

# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
#
# Security tests for XI/XI2 (XInput) extension vulnerabilities.
import struct
import pytest
from proto import xi
from xclient import Extension, X11Error, X11Reply
@pytest.fixture
def xi_xclient(xclient):
"""Provide an xclient with XI2 initialized."""
ext = xclient.query_extension(Extension.XI)
if not ext:
pytest.skip("XInput extension not available")
req = xi.XIQueryVersionRequest(opcode=ext.opcode)
xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
xclient.recv_response(timeout=5.0)
return xclient
class TestXIPassiveGrab:
"""Tests for XIPassiveGrabDevice/UngrabDevice vulnerabilities."""
def test_passive_grab_detail_above_255(self, xserver, xi_xclient):
"""
CVE-2022-46341 / ZDI-CAN-19381: OOB write via oversized detail
in XIPassiveGrabDevice.
The ``detail`` field is 32 bits on the wire but the server's
grab mask arrays are only 256 bits wide. A detail > 255
causes an OOB array access in the grab handling code.
The fix pretends that details > 255 are already grabbed,
returning a reply with XIAlreadyGrabbed status for every
requested modifier.
Fixed in commit 51eb63b0ee15 ("Xi: disallow passive grabs with a
detail > 255").
"""
opcode = xi_xclient.query_extension(Extension.XI).opcode
wid = xi_xclient.create_window()
req = xi.XIPassiveGrabDeviceRequest(
opcode=opcode,
grab_window=wid,
detail=256, # OOB: valid range is 0-255
grab_type=xi.XIGrabtypeButton,
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
resp = xi_xclient.recv_response(timeout=2.0)
assert xserver.is_alive, (
"Server crashed - OOB in XIPassiveGrabDevice (CVE-2022-46341)"
)
# The server returns a normal reply with every modifier marked
# as XIAlreadyGrabbed.
assert isinstance(resp, X11Reply), f"Expected a reply, got {resp}"
num_modifiers = struct.unpack_from("<H", resp.data, 8)[0]
assert num_modifiers > 0, "Expected at least one failed modifier"
for i in range(num_modifiers):
status = resp.data[32 + i * 8 + 4]
assert status == xi.XIAlreadyGrabbed, (
f"Modifier {i}: expected XIAlreadyGrabbed ({xi.XIAlreadyGrabbed}), "
f"got status {status}"
)
def test_passive_ungrab_detail_oob_write(self, xserver, xi_xclient):
"""
CVE-2022-46341 / ZDI-CAN-19381: OOB write in
ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice via oversized detail value.
The ``detail`` field is 32 bits on the wire but
DeleteDetailFromMask() uses it to index into a 256-bit
(8 x CARD32) mask array. A detail > 255 writes past the end
of the allocated mask, corrupting heap memory.
The fix rejects detail > 255 early, returning BadValue.
Fixed in commit 51eb63b0ee15 ("Xi: disallow passive grabs with a
detail > 255").
"""
opcode = xi_xclient.query_extension(Extension.XI).opcode
wid = xi_xclient.create_window()
req = xi.XIPassiveUngrabDeviceRequest(
opcode=opcode,
grab_window=wid,
detail=256, # OOB: valid range is 0-255
grab_type=xi.XIGrabtypeButton,
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
resp = xi_xclient.recv_response(timeout=2.0)
assert xserver.is_alive, (
"Server crashed - OOB write in XIPassiveUngrabDevice (CVE-2022-46341)"
)
# The fix returns BadValue (error code 2)
assert isinstance(resp, X11Error), f"Expected an error reply, got {resp}"
assert resp.error_code == 2, (
f"Expected BadValue (2), got error code {resp.error_code}"
)
class TestXIChangeProperty:
"""Tests for XIChangeProperty vulnerabilities."""
def test_num_items_overflow_truncation(self, xserver, xi_xclient):
"""
CVE-2022-46344 / ZDI-CAN-19405: Integer truncation in
ProcXIChangeProperty length check.
``totalSize = num_items * (format / 8)`` was computed as a 32-bit
int. With format=32 and num_items=0x40000000, the multiplication
overflows to 0, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. The server
would then read num_items elements from beyond the request buffer.
The fix changed totalSize from ``int`` to ``uint64_t``.
Fixed in commit 8f454b793e1f ("Xi: avoid integer truncation in
length check of ProcXIChangeProperty").
"""
opcode = xi_xclient.query_extension(Extension.XI).opcode
prop_atom = xi_xclient.intern_atom("_TEST_OVERFLOW")
type_atom = xi_xclient.intern_atom("INTEGER")
# format=32 (4 bytes per item), num_items=0x40000000
# totalSize as int32: 0x40000000 * 4 = 0x100000000 → truncates to 0
# totalSize as uint64: 0x100000000 → fails REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE
req = xi.XIChangePropertyRequest(
opcode=opcode,
deviceid=xi.VirtualCorePointer,
property_atom=prop_atom,
type_atom=type_atom,
format=32,
mode=xi.PropModeReplace,
num_items=0x40000000,
data=b"", # no actual data
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
resp = xi_xclient.recv_response(timeout=2.0)
assert xserver.is_alive, (
"Server crashed - integer truncation in XIChangeProperty (CVE-2022-46344)"
)
# The server should reject with BadLength (16). Without the fix
# the truncated totalSize (0) passes REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE and the
# server tries to allocate 4 GB, failing with BadAlloc (11)
# instead.
assert isinstance(resp, X11Error), f"Expected an error, got {resp}"
assert resp.error_code == 16, (
f"Expected BadLength (16), got error code {resp.error_code} - "
f"integer truncation not caught by length check"
)
def test_prepend_property_size_and_offset(self, xserver, xi_xclient):
"""
CVE-2023-5367 / ZDI-CAN-22153: Incorrect size and offset
calculation when prepending to XI device properties.
Two bugs in XIChangeDeviceProperty (and the identical RandR code):
1. new_value.size was set to ``len`` instead of ``total_len``
(new + existing), so the property lost the old data's size.
2. The old_data offset for PropModePrepend used
``prop_value->size`` instead of ``len``, placing old data at
the wrong position and writing out of bounds.
This test sets a property, then prepends to it and reads back
the result. On a fixed server, the property contains all values
in the correct order.
Fixed in commit 541ab2ecd41d ("Xi/randr: fix handling of
PropModeAppend/Prepend").
"""
opcode = xi_xclient.query_extension(Extension.XI).opcode
prop_atom = xi_xclient.intern_atom("_TEST_PREPEND")
type_atom = xi_xclient.intern_atom("INTEGER")
# Step 1: Set initial property with values [10, 20, 30]
initial_data = struct.pack("<III", 10, 20, 30)
req = xi.XIChangePropertyRequest(
opcode=opcode,
deviceid=xi.VirtualCorePointer,
property_atom=prop_atom,
type_atom=type_atom,
format=32,
mode=xi.PropModeReplace,
data=initial_data,
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
xi_xclient.flush_responses(timeout=0.5)
# Step 2: Prepend values [1, 2]
prepend_data = struct.pack("<II", 1, 2)
req = xi.XIChangePropertyRequest(
opcode=opcode,
deviceid=xi.VirtualCorePointer,
property_atom=prop_atom,
type_atom=type_atom,
format=32,
mode=xi.PropModePrepend,
data=prepend_data,
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
xi_xclient.flush_responses(timeout=0.5)
assert xserver.is_alive, (
"Server crashed - OOB write in XIChangeProperty prepend (CVE-2023-5367)"
)
# Step 3: Read back and verify
req = xi.XIGetPropertyRequest(
opcode=opcode,
deviceid=xi.VirtualCorePointer,
property_atom=prop_atom,
type_atom=type_atom,
)
xi_xclient.send_request(req.to_bytes())
resp = xi_xclient.recv_response(timeout=2.0)
assert isinstance(resp, X11Reply), f"Expected a reply, got {resp}"
num_items = struct.unpack_from("<I", resp.data, 16)[0]
assert num_items == 5, (
f"Expected 5 items (2 prepended + 3 original), got {num_items}"
)
values = struct.unpack_from(f"<{num_items}I", resp.data, 32)
assert values == (1, 2, 10, 20, 30), (
f"Expected (1, 2, 10, 20, 30), got {values}"
)