Similar to the recent fixes, add more _XkbCheckRequestBounds() to the
functions that loop over the request data, i.e.:
* CheckKeySyms()
* CheckKeyActions()
* CheckKeyBehaviors()
* CheckVirtualMods()
* CheckKeyExplicit()
* CheckVirtualModMap()
* _XkbSetMapChecks()
All these are static functions so we can add the client to the parameters
without breaking any API.
See also:
CVE-2026-34003, ZDI-CAN-28736, CVE-2026-34002, ZDI-CAN-28737
v2: Check for "nSyms != 0" in CheckKeySyms() to avoid false positives.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit d38c563fab)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2177>
The function CheckKeyTypes() will loop over the client's request but
won't perform any additional bound checking to ensure that the data
read remains within the request bounds.
As a result, a specifically crafted request may cause CheckKeyTypes() to
read past the request data, as reported by valgrind:
== Invalid read of size 2
== at 0x5A3D1D: CheckKeyTypes (xkb.c:1694)
== by 0x5A6A9C: _XkbSetMapChecks (xkb.c:2515)
== by 0x5A759E: ProcXkbSetMap (xkb.c:2736)
== by 0x5BF832: SProcXkbSetMap (xkbSwap.c:245)
== by 0x5C05ED: SProcXkbDispatch (xkbSwap.c:501)
== by 0x4A20DF: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
== by 0x4B03B4: dix_main (main.c:277)
== by 0x428941: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Address is 30 bytes after a block of size 28,672 in arena "client"
==
== Invalid read of size 2
== at 0x5A3AB6: CheckKeyTypes (xkb.c:1669)
== by 0x5A6A9C: _XkbSetMapChecks (xkb.c:2515)
== by 0x5A759E: ProcXkbSetMap (xkb.c:2736)
== by 0x5BF832: SProcXkbSetMap (xkbSwap.c:245)
== by 0x5C05ED: SProcXkbDispatch (xkbSwap.c:501)
== by 0x4A20DF: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
== by 0x4B03B4: dix_main (main.c:277)
== by 0x428941: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Address is 2 bytes after a block of size 28,672 alloc'd
== at 0x4848897: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1804)
== by 0x5E357A: ReadRequestFromClient (io.c:336)
== by 0x4A1FAB: Dispatch (dispatch.c:519)
== by 0x4B03B4: dix_main (main.c:277)
== by 0x428941: main (stubmain.c:34)
==
== Invalid write of size 2
== at 0x5A3AD7: CheckKeyTypes (xkb.c:1669)
== by 0x5A6A9C: _XkbSetMapChecks (xkb.c:2515)
== by 0x5A759E: ProcXkbSetMap (xkb.c:2736)
== by 0x5BF832: SProcXkbSetMap (xkbSwap.c:245)
== by 0x5C05ED: SProcXkbDispatch (xkbSwap.c:501)
== by 0x4A20DF: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
== by 0x4B03B4: dix_main (main.c:277)
== by 0x428941: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Address is 2 bytes after a block of size 28,672 alloc'd
== at 0x4848897: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1804)
== by 0x5E357A: ReadRequestFromClient (io.c:336)
== by 0x4A1FAB: Dispatch (dispatch.c:519)
== by 0x4B03B4: dix_main (main.c:277)
== by 0x428941: main (stubmain.c:34)
==
To avoid that issue, add additional bounds checking within the loops by
calling _XkbCheckRequestBounds() and report an error if we are to read
past the client's request.
CVE-2026-34003, ZDI-CAN-28736
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit b85b00dd7b)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2177>
As reported by valgrind:
== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
== at 0x547E5B: CheckModifierMap (xkb.c:1972)
== by 0x54A086: _XkbSetMapChecks (xkb.c:2574)
== by 0x54A845: ProcXkbSetMap (xkb.c:2741)
== by 0x556EF4: ProcXkbDispatch (xkb.c:7048)
== by 0x454A8C: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
== by 0x462CEB: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x405EA7: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
== at 0x4840B26: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:447)
== by 0x592D5A: AllocateInputBuffer (io.c:981)
== by 0x591F77: InsertFakeRequest (io.c:516)
== by 0x45CA27: NextAvailableClient (dispatch.c:3629)
== by 0x58FA81: AllocNewConnection (connection.c:628)
== by 0x58FC70: EstablishNewConnections (connection.c:692)
== by 0x58FFAA: HandleNotifyFd (connection.c:809)
== by 0x593F42: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:660)
== by 0x58B9B6: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:208)
== by 0x4548AC: Dispatch (dispatch.c:493)
== by 0x462CEB: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x405EA7: main (stubmain.c:34)
The issue is that the loop in CheckModifierMap() reads from wire without
verifying that the data is within the request bounds.
The req->totalModMapKeys value could exceed the actual data provided,
causing reads of uninitialized memory.
To fix that issue, we add a bounds check using _XkbCheckRequestBounds,
but for that, we need to also pass a ClientPtr parameter, which is not
a problem since CheckModifierMap() is a private, static function.
CVE-2026-34002, ZDI-CAN-28737
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit f056ce1cc9)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2177>
As reported by valgrind:
== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
== at 0x5CBE66: SrvXkbAddGeomKeyAlias (XKBGAlloc.c:585)
== by 0x5AC7D5: _CheckSetGeom (xkb.c:5607)
== by 0x5AC952: _XkbSetGeometry (xkb.c:5643)
== by 0x5ACB58: ProcXkbSetGeometry (xkb.c:5684)
== by 0x5B0DAC: ProcXkbDispatch (xkb.c:7070)
== by 0x4A28C5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:553)
== by 0x4B0B24: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x42915E: main (stubmain.c:34)
== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
== at 0x4840B26: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:447)
== by 0x5E13B0: AllocateInputBuffer (io.c:981)
== by 0x5E05CD: InsertFakeRequest (io.c:516)
== by 0x4AA860: NextAvailableClient (dispatch.c:3629)
== by 0x5DE0D7: AllocNewConnection (connection.c:628)
== by 0x5DE2C6: EstablishNewConnections (connection.c:692)
== by 0x5DE600: HandleNotifyFd (connection.c:809)
== by 0x5E2598: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:660)
== by 0x5DA00C: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:208)
== by 0x4A26E5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:493)
== by 0x4B0B24: dix_main (main.c:274)
== by 0x42915E: main (stubmain.c:34)
Each key alias entry contains two key names (the alias and the real key
name), each of size XkbKeyNameLength.
The current bounds check only validates the first name, allowing
XkbAddGeomKeyAlias to potentially read uninitialized memory when
accessing the second name at &wire[XkbKeyNameLength].
To fix this, change the value to check to use 2 * XkbKeyNameLength to
validate the bounds.
CVE-2026-34000, ZDI-CAN-28679
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 81b6a34f90)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2177>
If the "compat" buffer has previously been truncated, there will be
unused space in the buffer. The code uses this space, but does not
update the number of valid entries in the buffer.
In the best case, this leads to the new compat entries being ignored. In the
worst case, if there are any "skipped" compat entries, the number of
valid entries will be corrupted, potentially leading to a buffer read
overrun when processing a future request.
Set the number of used "compat" entries when re-using previously
allocated space in the buffer.
CVE-2026-33999, ZDI-CAN-28593
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b024ae1749)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2177>
Before this commit the count of key type level names was wrongly set
in `XkbGetNames`: for key type without names, it was set to the level
count, while it should be 0:
- `XkbComputeGetNamesReplySize()` does not account key type without
level names;
- `XkbSendNames()` does not write any level entry for key types without
level names.
This causes a mismatch offset while parsing the response and its
processing would ultimately fail.
Fixed by setting the correct level name count: 0 if there is no level
name, else the number of levels.
(cherry picked from commit c49cbc176a)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2151>
A key type that has no level names is legit. Before this commit,
`XkbCopyKeymap` would make such level inconsistent by setting its
number of levels to 0 while keeping its map entries. It suffices
to clear the names array.
Fixed by copying the level count from the source type.
WARNING: this will trigger an error in `XkbGetNames`, which worked
before this commit only by chance. This is fixed in the next commit.
(cherry picked from commit 12605989af)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2151>
When a group indicator (or a latched indicator of any kind) is defined,
e.g.:
indicator "Scroll Lock" { groups = Group2; }
the logical and physical indicator state may desync across multiple
connected keyboards.
This is caused by XkbPushLockedStateToSlaves only pushing locked_mods to
the slave devices. Pushing locked_group (as well as latched groups/mods)
along with locked_mods resolves the issue.
The issue is not observed with API calls because a different code path
is taken (avoiding XkbPushLockedStateToSlaves altogether).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Melnyk <inboxnumberzero@zoho.com>
(cherry picked from commit 36a7fdd315)
(cherry picked from commit a9ee6b7326)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2151>
The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
using an unsigned short.
However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.
To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.
CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49ac)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated
with the device, but not the resource associated with it.
As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function
gets called and accesses already freed memory:
| Invalid read of size 8
| at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047)
| by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094)
| by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890)
| by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156)
| by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550)
| by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601)
| by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657)
| by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206)
| by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd
| at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989)
| by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067)
| by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193)
| by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244)
| by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348)
| by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Block was alloc'd at
| at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675)
| by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262)
| by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846)
| by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153)
| by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493)
| by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390)
| by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551)
| by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277)
| by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34)
To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the
device XkbInterest data.
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 10c94238bd)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file.
In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources
from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead.
This is related to:
CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 99790a2c92)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
Consider the following keymap:
```xkb
xkb_keymap {
xkb_keycodes {
<compose> = 135;
};
xkb_symbols {
key <compose> {
[ SetGroup(group = +1) ]
};
};
};
```
When the user presses the compose key, the following happens:
1. The compositor forwards the key to Xwayland.
2. Xwayland executes the SetGroup action and sets the base_group to 1
and the effective group to 1.
3. The compositor updates its own state and sends the effective group,
1, to Xwayland.
4. Xwayland sets the locked group to 1 and the effective group to
1 + 1 = 2.
This is wrong since pressing compose should set the effective group to 1
but to X applications the effective group appears to be 2.
This commit makes it so that Xwayland completely ignores the key
behaviors and actions of the keymap and only updates the modifier and
group components in response to the wayland modifiers events.
Signed-off-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 45c1d22ff6)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2060>
Handles common case of allocating & copying string to temporary buffer
(cherry picked from xorg/lib/libxkbfile@8a91517ca6ea77633476595b0eb5b213357c60e5)
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 42a1f25faf)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1895>
Fixes formatting of negative numbers, so they don't show minus sign
after the decimal point.
(cherry picked from xorg/lib/libxkbfile@d2ec504fec2550f4fd046e801b34317ef4a4bab9)
Reviewed-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7a23010232)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1895>
Passing a negative value in `needed` to the `XkbResizeKeyActions()`
function can create a `newActs` array of an unespected size.
Check the value and return if it is invalid.
This error has been found by a static analysis tool. This is the report:
Error: OVERRUN (CWE-119):
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:811: cond_const:
Checking "xkb->server->size_acts == 0" implies that
"xkb->server->size_acts" is 0 on the true branch.
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:811: buffer_alloc:
"calloc" allocates 8 bytes dictated by parameters
"(size_t)((xkb->server->size_acts == 0) ? 1 : xkb->server->size_acts)"
and "8UL".
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:811: var_assign:
Assigning: "newActs" = "calloc((size_t)((xkb->server->size_acts == 0) ? 1 : xkb->server->size_acts), 8UL)".
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:815: assignment:
Assigning: "nActs" = "1".
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:829: cond_at_least:
Checking "nCopy > 0" implies that "nCopy" is at least 1 on the
true branch.
libX11-1.8.7/src/xkb/XKBMAlloc.c:830: overrun-buffer-arg:
Overrunning buffer pointed to by "&newActs[nActs]" of 8 bytes by
passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 15
using argument "nCopy * 8UL" (which evaluates to 8).
# 828|
# 829| if (nCopy > 0)
# 830|-> memcpy(&newActs[nActs], XkbKeyActionsPtr(xkb, i),
# 831| nCopy * sizeof(XkbAction));
# 832| if (nCopy < nKeyActs)
(cherry picked from xorg/lib/libx11@af1312d2873d2ce49b18708a5029895aed477392)
Signed-off-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6d33834186)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1895>
If there was a previous radio_groups array which we failed to realloc
and freed instead, clear the array size in the XkbNamesRec.
Taken from xorg/lib/libx11@258a8ced681dc1bc50396be7439fce23f9807e2a
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
(cherry picked from commit 09c6f09eb7)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1895>
If XkbChangeTypesOfKey() is called with nGroups == 0, it will resize the
key syms to 0 but leave the key actions unchanged.
If later, the same function is called with a non-zero value for nGroups,
this will cause a buffer overflow because the key actions are of the wrong
size.
To avoid the issue, make sure to resize both the key syms and key actions
when nGroups is 0.
CVE-2025-26597, ZDI-CAN-25683
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 0e4ed94952)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1831>
The computation of the length in XkbSizeKeySyms() differs from what is
actually written in XkbWriteKeySyms(), leading to a heap overflow.
Fix the calculation in XkbSizeKeySyms() to match what kbWriteKeySyms()
does.
CVE-2025-26596, ZDI-CAN-25543
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 80d69f0142)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1831>
The code in XkbVModMaskText() allocates a fixed sized buffer on the
stack and copies the virtual mod name.
There's actually two issues in the code that can lead to a buffer
overflow.
First, the bound check mixes pointers and integers using misplaced
parenthesis, defeating the bound check.
But even though, if the check fails, the data is still copied, so the
stack overflow will occur regardless.
Change the logic to skip the copy entirely if the bound check fails.
CVE-2025-26595, ZDI-CAN-25545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 11fcda8753)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1831>
Consider the following keymap:
```xkb
xkb_keymap {
xkb_keycodes {
<compose> = 135;
};
xkb_symbols {
key <compose> {
[ SetGroup(group = +1) ]
};
};
};
```
When the user presses the compose key, the following happens:
1. The compositor forwards the key to Xwayland.
2. Xwayland executes the SetGroup action and sets the base_group to 1
and the effective group to 1.
3. The compositor updates its own state and sends the effective group,
1, to Xwayland.
4. Xwayland sets the locked group to 1 and the effective group to
1 + 1 = 2.
This is wrong since pressing compose should set the effective group to 1
but to X applications the effective group appears to be 2.
This commit makes it so that Xwayland completely ignores the key
behaviors and actions of the keymap and only updates the modifier and
group components in response to the wayland modifiers events.
Signed-off-by: Julian Orth <ju.orth@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 45c1d22ff6)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1766>
Generating the modifier modmap, the helper function generate_modkeymap()
would check the entire range up to the MAP_LENGTH.
However, the given keymap might have less keycodes than MAP_LENGTH, in
which case we would go beyond the size of the modmap, as reported by
ASAN:
==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow
READ of size 1 at 0x5110001c225b thread T0
#0 0x5e7369393873 in generate_modkeymap ../dix/inpututils.c:309
#1 0x5e736930dcce in ProcGetModifierMapping ../dix/devices.c:1794
#2 0x5e7369336489 in Dispatch ../dix/dispatch.c:550
#3 0x5e736934407d in dix_main ../dix/main.c:275
#5 0x7e46d47b2ecb in __libc_start_main
#6 0x5e73691be324 in _start (xserver/build/hw/xwayland/Xwayland)
Address is located 0 bytes after 219-byte region
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7e46d4cfc542 in realloc
#1 0x5e73695aa90e in _XkbCopyClientMap ../xkb/xkbUtils.c:1142
#2 0x5e73695aa90e in XkbCopyKeymap ../xkb/xkbUtils.c:1966
#3 0x5e73695b1b2f in XkbDeviceApplyKeymap ../xkb/xkbUtils.c:2023
#4 0x5e73691c6c18 in keyboard_handle_keymap ../hw/xwayland/xwayland-input.c:1194
As MAP_LENGTH is used in various code paths where the max keycode might
not be easily available, best is to always use MAP_LENGTH to allocate the
keymaps so that the code never run past the buffer size.
If the max key code is smaller than the MAP_LENGTH limit, fill-in the gap
with zeros.
That also simplifies the code slightly as we do not constantly need to
reallocate the keymap to adjust to the max key code size.
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1780
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 92bcebfd7e)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1766>
The _XkbSetCompatMap() function attempts to resize the `sym_interpret`
buffer.
However, It didn't update its size properly. It updated `num_si` only,
without updating `size_si`.
This may lead to local privilege escalation if the server is run as root
or remote code execution (e.g. x11 over ssh).
CVE-2024-9632, ZDI-CAN-24756
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Tested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 85b7765714)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1735>
This function is only used inside the same .c file where it's defined,
no outside users, also not in drivers. Thus no need to keep it exported.
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <info@metux.net>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1468>
These functions are just used for reading auth file or calling xkbcomp while
dropping privileges, in case the Xserver is started as unprivileged user
with suid-root. Thus, shouldn't be used (and aren't used) by drivers.
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <info@metux.net>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1370>
It's already defined in input.h, and that's where it belongs.
(we see from the header, which symbols belong to the module api)
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <info@metux.net>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1274>
This breaks the xf86-input-synaptics driver:
synaptics.c: In function 'clickpad_guess_clickfingers':
synaptics.c:2638:5: error: implicit declaration of function 'BUG_RETURN_VAL' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
2638 | BUG_RETURN_VAL(hw->num_mt_mask > sizeof(close_point) * 8, 0);
This reverts commit 442aec2219.
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1316>
No need to define XKBSRV_NEED_FILE_FUNCS, for about 15 years now
(since XKBsrv.h isn't used anymore), so drop it.
Fixes: e5f002edde
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <info@metux.net>
Yet another step of uncluttering includes: move out the BUG_* macros
into a separate header, which then is included as-needed.
Signed-off-by: Enrico Weigelt, metux IT consult <info@metux.net>
The XKM_OUTPUT_DIR folder by default is defined as ${datadir}/X11/xkb/compiled
and it is usually defined as /var/lib/xkb or %{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb by
distributions. If X is executed as non-root it won't have permissions to write
into that folder. If we fallback directly to /tmp we might get name collisions:
```
> Error: Cannot open "/tmp/server-10.xkm" to write keyboard description
> Exiting
```
Where the file /tmp/server-10.xkm already exists but is owned by another user
that previously executed X and had the display number 10. This is specially
problematic when exeuting Xvfb.
Before falling back to /tmp/ check first the XDG_RUNTIME_DIR.
This is to make sure the hardware gets the device states regardless
whether the internal state has changed or not, to overcome situations
that device LEDs are out of sync e.g. switching between VTs.
Signed-off-by: Yao Wei (魏銘廷) <yao.wei@canonical.com>
Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
already freed memory.
CVE-2022-4283, ZDI-CAN-19530
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Acked-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
_XkbCheckRequestBounds assumes that from..to is at least one byte.
However, request strings can be empty, causing spurious failures in
XkbGetKbdByName calls. To avoid this, before checking bounds make
sure that the length is nonzero.
GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Each string length field was accessed before checking whether that byte
was actually part of the client request. No real harm here since it
would immediately fail with BadLength anyway, but let's be correct here.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
This request accessed &stuff[1] before length-checking everything. The
check was performed afterwards so invalid requests would return
BadLength anyway, but let's do this before we actually access the
memory.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
No validation of the various fields on that report were done, so a
malicious client could send a short request that claims it had N
sections, or rows, or keys, and the server would process the request for
N sections, running out of bounds of the actual request data.
Fix this by adding size checks to ensure our data is valid.
ZDI-CAN 16062, CVE-2022-2319.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
XKB often uses a FooCheck and Foo function pair, the former is supposed
to check all values in the request and error out on BadLength,
BadValue, etc. The latter is then called once we're confident the values
are good (they may still fail on an individual device, but that's a
different topic).
In the case of XkbSetDeviceInfo, those functions were incorrectly
named, with XkbSetDeviceInfo ending up as the checker function and
XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck as the setter function. As a result, the setter
function was called before the checker function, accessing request
data and modifying device state before we ensured that the data is
valid.
In particular, the setter function relied on values being already
byte-swapped. This in turn could lead to potential OOB memory access.
Fix this by correctly naming the functions and moving the length checks
over to the checker function. These were added in 87c64fc5b0 to the
wrong function, probably due to the incorrect naming.
Fixes ZDI-CAN 16070, CVE-2022-2320.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Introduced in c06e27b2f6
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Most similar loops here use a pointer that advances with each loop
iteration, let's do the same here for consistency.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Sick of fighting vim and git from trying to add this fix with every
commit iteration...
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
This header merely defines the various protocol request handlers, so
let's rename it to something less generic and remove its include from
all the files that don't actually need it (which is almost all of them).
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Let's move this to where all the other protocol handlers are.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
