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dix: integer overflow in ProcPutImage() [CVE-2014-8092 1/4]
ProcPutImage() calculates a length field from a width, left pad and depth
specified by the client (if the specified format is XYPixmap).
The calculations for the total amount of memory the server needs for the
pixmap can overflow a 32-bit number, causing out-of-bounds memory writes
on 32-bit systems (since the length is stored in a long int variable).
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit eeae42d60b)
Signed-off-by: Julien Cristau <jcristau@debian.org>
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1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -1956,6 +1956,9 @@ ProcPutImage(ClientPtr client)
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tmpImage = (char *) &stuff[1];
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lengthProto = length;
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if (lengthProto >= (INT32_MAX / stuff->height))
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return BadLength;
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if ((bytes_to_int32(lengthProto * stuff->height) +
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bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xPutImageReq))) != client->req_len)
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return BadLength;
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