xkb: reject key types with num_levels exceeding XkbMaxShiftLevel

CheckKeyTypes validates incoming key type definitions from XkbSetMap
requests but does not enforce an upper bound on numLevels. A client can set
numLevels up to 255 on a non-canonical key type, which is stored in the
server's type table.

When ChangeKeyboardMapping later triggers XkbUpdateKeyTypesFromCore, the
function XkbKeyTypesForCoreSymbols computes groupsWidth from num_levels and
uses the XKB_OFFSET(g, l) = (g * groupsWidth) + l macro to index into
tsyms[], a stack-allocated buffer of XkbMaxSymsPerKey (252) entries. With
num_levels=255, groupsWidth=255, and indices reach up to 3*255+254 = 1019,
overflowing the 252-element stack buffer by 767 KeySym-sized entries.

Fix by rejecting numLevels values greater than XkbMaxShiftLevel (63) in
CheckKeyTypes, alongside the existing lower-bound check for numLevels < 1.

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative

ZDI-CAN-30160

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2228>

xkb/xkb.c

@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ CheckKeyTypes(ClientPtr client,
         }
         n = i + req->firstType;
         width = wire->numLevels;
-        if (width < 1) {
+        if (width < 1 || width > XkbMaxShiftLevel) {
             *nMapsRtrn = _XkbErrCode3(0x04, n, width);
             return 0;
         }