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xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap()

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The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
using an unsigned short.

However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.

To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.

CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560

This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative

Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2086>
This commit is contained in:
Olivier Fourdan 2025-09-10 16:30:29 +02:00
parent 10c94238bd
commit 475d9f49ac
1 changed files with 2 additions and 0 deletions
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2
xkb/xkb.c
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@ -2990,6 +2990,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
XkbSymInterpretPtr sym; XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
unsigned int skipped = 0; unsigned int skipped = 0;
if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX)
return BadValue;
if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) { if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI; compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret, compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,