Remove Xserver API for security extension (#ifdef _SECURITY_SERVER) [Will

break Xorg server builds prior to 2006-06-20 / git commit
    d44b2a0a57fb89741173c31676af0ccc822387dc]
This commit is contained in:
Alan Coopersmith 2006-06-21 21:20:22 +00:00
parent cb67dc3636
commit 7bcd3400a8
2 changed files with 7 additions and 84 deletions

View file

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
2006-06-20 Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@sun.com>
* security.h:
Remove Xserver API for security extension (#ifdef _SECURITY_SERVER)
[Will break Xorg server builds prior to 2006-06-20 / git commit
d44b2a0a57fb89741173c31676af0ccc822387dc]
2005-12-14 Kevin E. Martin <kem-at-freedesktop-dot-org>
* configure.ac:

View file

@ -106,90 +106,6 @@ typedef struct {
XSecurityAuthorization auth_id; /* revoked authorization id */
} XSecurityAuthorizationRevokedEvent;
#else /* _SECURITY_SERVER */
#include "input.h" /* for DeviceIntPtr */
#include "property.h" /* for PropertyPtr */
#include "pixmap.h" /* for DrawablePtr */
#include "resource.h" /* for RESTYPE */
/* resource type to pass in LookupIDByType for authorizations */
extern RESTYPE SecurityAuthorizationResType;
/* this is what we store for an authorization */
typedef struct {
XID id; /* resource ID */
CARD32 timeout; /* how long to live in seconds after refcnt == 0 */
unsigned int trustLevel; /* trusted/untrusted */
XID group; /* see embedding extension */
unsigned int refcnt; /* how many clients connected with this auth */
unsigned int secondsRemaining; /* overflow time amount for >49 days */
OsTimerPtr timer; /* timer for this auth */
struct _OtherClients *eventClients; /* clients wanting events */
} SecurityAuthorizationRec, *SecurityAuthorizationPtr;
/* The following callback is called when a GenerateAuthorization request
* is processed to sanity check the group argument. The call data will
* be a pointer to a SecurityValidateGroupInfoRec (below).
* Functions registered on this callback are expected to examine the
* group and set the valid field to TRUE if they recognize the group as a
* legitimate group. If they don't recognize it, they should not change the
* valid field.
*/
extern CallbackListPtr SecurityValidateGroupCallback;
typedef struct {
XID group; /* the group that was sent in GenerateAuthorization */
Bool valid; /* did anyone recognize it? if so, set to TRUE */
} SecurityValidateGroupInfoRec;
/* Proc vectors for untrusted clients, swapped and unswapped versions.
* These are the same as the normal proc vectors except that extensions
* that haven't declared themselves secure will have ProcBadRequest plugged
* in for their major opcode dispatcher. This prevents untrusted clients
* from guessing extension major opcodes and using the extension even though
* the extension can't be listed or queried.
*/
extern int (*UntrustedProcVector[256])(ClientPtr client);
extern int (*SwappedUntrustedProcVector[256])(ClientPtr client);
extern Bool SecurityCheckDeviceAccess(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
Bool fromRequest);
extern void SecurityAudit(char *format, ...);
#ifdef LBX
extern Bool SecuritySameLevel(ClientPtr client, XID authId);
#endif
extern int XSecurityOptions(int argc, char **argv, int i);
/* Give this value or higher to the -audit option to get security messages */
#define SECURITY_AUDIT_LEVEL 4
extern void SecurityCensorImage(
ClientPtr client,
RegionPtr pVisibleRegion,
long widthBytesLine,
DrawablePtr pDraw,
int x, int y, int w, int h,
unsigned int format,
char * pBuf);
#define SecurityAllowOperation 0
#define SecurityIgnoreOperation 1
#define SecurityErrorOperation 2
char
SecurityCheckPropertyAccess(
ClientPtr client,
WindowPtr pWin,
ATOM propertyName,
Mask access_mode);
#define SECURITY_POLICY_FILE_VERSION "version-1"
char **SecurityGetSitePolicyStrings(int *n);
#endif /* _SECURITY_SERVER */
#endif /* _SECURITY_H */