mirror of
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.git
synced 2026-01-11 07:30:16 +01:00
bd8d49495b
Historically, the NMSetting types were in public headers. Theoretically,
that allowed users to subtype our classes. However in practice that was
impossible because they lacked required access to internal functions to
fully create an NMSetting class outside of libnm. And it also was not
useful, because you simply cannot extend libnm by subtyping a libnm
class. And supporting such a use case would be hard and limit what we can
do in libnm.
Having GObject structs in public headers also require that we don't
change it's layout. The ABI of those structs must not change, if anybody
out there was actually subclassing our GObjects.
In libnm 1.34 (commit e46d484fae ('libnm: hide NMSetting types from
public headers')) we moved the structs from headers to internal.
This would have caused a compiler error if anybody was using those
struct definitions. However, we still didn't change the ABI/layout so
that we didn't break users who relied on it (for whatever reason).
It doesn't seem there were any affected user. We waited long enough.
Change internal ABI.
No longer use g_type_class_add_private(). Instead, embed the private
structs directly (_NM_GET_PRIVATE()) or indirectly
(_NM_GET_PRIVATE_PTR()) in the object.
The main benefit is for debugging in the debugger, where we can now
easily find the private data. Previously that was so cumbersome to be
effectively impossible.
It's also the fastest possible way, since NM_SETTING_*_GET_PRIVATE()
literally resolves to "&self->_priv" (plus static asserts and
nm_assert() for type checking).
_NM_GET_PRIVATE() also propagates constness and requires that the
argument is a compatible pointer type (at compile time).
Note that g_type_class_add_private() is also deprecated in glib 2.58 and
replaced by G_ADD_PRIVATE(). For one, we still don't rely on 2.58. Also,
G_ADD_PRIVATE() is a worse solution as it supports a usecase that we
don't care for (public structs in headers). _NM_GET_PRIVATE() is still
faster, works with older glib and most importantly: is better for
debugging as you can find the private data from an object pointer.
For NMSettingIPConfig this is rather awkward, because all direct
properties require a common "klass->private_offset". This was however
the case before this change. Nothing new here. And if you ever touch
this and do something wrong, many unit tests will fail. It's almost
impossible to get wrong, albeit it can be confusing to understand.
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager/-/merge_requests/1773
604 lines
20 KiB
C
604 lines
20 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
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*/
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#include "libnm-core-impl/nm-default-libnm-core.h"
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#include "nm-setting-macsec.h"
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include "libnm-glib-aux/nm-secret-utils.h"
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#include "nm-utils.h"
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#include "nm-setting-connection.h"
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#include "nm-setting-private.h"
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#include "nm-setting-wired.h"
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#include "nm-connection-private.h"
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/**
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* SECTION:nm-setting-macsec
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* @short_description: Describes connection properties for MACSEC interfaces
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*
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* The #NMSettingMacsec object is a #NMSetting subclass that describes properties
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* necessary for connection to MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) interfaces.
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**/
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/*****************************************************************************/
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NM_GOBJECT_PROPERTIES_DEFINE_BASE(PROP_PARENT,
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PROP_MODE,
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PROP_ENCRYPT,
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PROP_MKA_CAK,
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PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
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PROP_MKA_CKN,
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PROP_PORT,
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PROP_VALIDATION,
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PROP_SEND_SCI, );
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typedef struct {
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char *parent;
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char *mka_cak;
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char *mka_ckn;
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guint mka_cak_flags;
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gint32 mode;
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gint32 validation;
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gint32 port;
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bool encrypt;
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bool send_sci;
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} NMSettingMacsecPrivate;
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/**
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* NMSettingMacsec:
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*
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* MACSec Settings
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*/
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struct _NMSettingMacsec {
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NMSetting parent;
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NMSettingMacsecPrivate _priv;
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};
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struct _NMSettingMacsecClass {
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NMSettingClass parent;
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};
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G_DEFINE_TYPE(NMSettingMacsec, nm_setting_macsec, NM_TYPE_SETTING)
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#define NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(o) \
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_NM_GET_PRIVATE(o, NMSettingMacsec, NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC, NMSetting)
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_parent:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:parent property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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const char *
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nm_setting_macsec_get_parent(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->parent;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_mode:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mode property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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NMSettingMacsecMode
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nm_setting_macsec_get_mode(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mode;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:encrypt property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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gboolean
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nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->encrypt;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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const char *
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nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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NMSettingSecretFlags
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nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_cak_flags;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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const char *
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nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NULL);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->mka_ckn;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_port:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:port property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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int
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nm_setting_macsec_get_port(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), 1);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->port;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_validation:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:validation property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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NMSettingMacsecValidation
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nm_setting_macsec_get_validation(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_DISABLE);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->validation;
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}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci:
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* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
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*
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* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:send-sci property of the setting
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*
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* Since: 1.12
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**/
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gboolean
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nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci(NMSettingMacsec *setting)
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{
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g_return_val_if_fail(NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC(setting), TRUE);
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return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting)->send_sci;
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}
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static GPtrArray *
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need_secrets(NMSetting *setting, gboolean check_rerequest)
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{
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NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
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GPtrArray *secrets = NULL;
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if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
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if ((check_rerequest || !priv->mka_cak)
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&& !NM_FLAGS_HAS(priv->mka_cak_flags, NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED)) {
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secrets = g_ptr_array_sized_new(1);
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g_ptr_array_add(secrets, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
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}
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}
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return secrets;
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}
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/*********************************************************************/
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static gboolean
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verify_macsec_key(const char *key, gboolean cak, GError **error)
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{
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size_t len;
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/* CAK is a connection secret and can be NULL for various
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* reasons (agent-owned, no permissions to get secrets, etc.)
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*/
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if (cak && !key)
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return TRUE;
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if (!key || !key[0]) {
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g_set_error_literal(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("the key is empty"));
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return FALSE;
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}
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len = strlen(key);
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if (cak) {
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if (len != NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_LENGTH) {
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g_set_error(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("the key must be %d characters"),
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_LENGTH);
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return FALSE;
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}
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} else {
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if (len < 2 || len > 64 || len % 2 != 0) {
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g_set_error_literal(
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error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("the key must have an even number of characters between 2 and 64"));
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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if (!NM_STRCHAR_ALL(key, ch, g_ascii_isxdigit(ch))) {
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g_set_error_literal(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("the key contains non-hexadecimal characters"));
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return FALSE;
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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static gboolean
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verify(NMSetting *setting, NMConnection *connection, GError **error)
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{
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NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(setting);
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NMSettingConnection *s_con = NULL;
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NMSettingWired *s_wired = NULL;
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NMSetting8021x *s_8021x = NULL;
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if (connection) {
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s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection(connection);
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s_wired = nm_connection_get_setting_wired(connection);
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s_8021x = nm_connection_get_setting_802_1x(connection);
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}
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if (priv->parent) {
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if (nm_utils_is_uuid(priv->parent)) {
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/* If we have an NMSettingConnection:master with slave-type="macsec",
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* then it must be the same UUID.
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*/
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if (s_con) {
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const char *master = NULL, *slave_type = NULL;
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slave_type = nm_setting_connection_get_slave_type(s_con);
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if (!g_strcmp0(slave_type, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME))
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master = nm_setting_connection_get_master(s_con);
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if (master && g_strcmp0(priv->parent, master) != 0) {
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g_set_error(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("'%s' value doesn't match '%s=%s'"),
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priv->parent,
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NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_MASTER,
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master);
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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} else if (!nm_utils_iface_valid_name(priv->parent)) {
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/* parent must be either a UUID or an interface name */
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g_set_error(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("'%s' is neither an UUID nor an interface name"),
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priv->parent);
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
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return FALSE;
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}
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} else {
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/* If parent is NULL, the parent must be specified via
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* NMSettingWired:mac-address.
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*/
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if (connection && (!s_wired || !nm_setting_wired_get_mac_address(s_wired))) {
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g_set_error(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
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_("property is not specified and neither is '%s:%s'"),
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NM_SETTING_WIRED_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_WIRED_MAC_ADDRESS);
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
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if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_ckn, FALSE, error)) {
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
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return FALSE;
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}
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if (!verify_macsec_key(priv->mka_cak, TRUE, error)) {
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
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return FALSE;
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}
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} else if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_EAP) {
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if (!s_8021x) {
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g_set_error(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_SETTING,
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_("EAP key management requires '%s' setting presence"),
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NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME);
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g_prefix_error(error, "%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME);
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return FALSE;
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}
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} else {
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g_set_error_literal(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("must be either psk (0) or eap (1)"));
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g_prefix_error(error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE);
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return FALSE;
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}
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nm_assert(priv->port >= 1 && priv->port <= 65534);
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if (priv->mode != NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK && (priv->mka_cak || priv->mka_ckn)) {
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g_set_error_literal(error,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
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NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
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_("only valid for psk mode"));
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g_prefix_error(error,
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"%s.%s: ",
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME,
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priv->mka_cak ? NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK : NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
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return NM_SETTING_VERIFY_NORMALIZABLE;
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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static void
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nm_setting_macsec_init(NMSettingMacsec *self)
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{}
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/**
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* nm_setting_macsec_new:
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*
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* Creates a new #NMSettingMacsec object with default values.
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*
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* Returns: (transfer full): the new empty #NMSettingMacsec object
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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NMSetting *
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nm_setting_macsec_new(void)
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{
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return g_object_new(NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NULL);
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}
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static void
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nm_setting_macsec_class_init(NMSettingMacsecClass *klass)
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{
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GObjectClass *object_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS(klass);
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NMSettingClass *setting_class = NM_SETTING_CLASS(klass);
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GArray *properties_override = _nm_sett_info_property_override_create_array();
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object_class->get_property = _nm_setting_property_get_property_direct;
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object_class->set_property = _nm_setting_property_set_property_direct;
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setting_class->verify = verify;
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setting_class->need_secrets = need_secrets;
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/**
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* NMSettingMacsec:parent:
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*
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* If given, specifies the parent interface name or parent connection UUID
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* from which this MACSEC interface should be created. If this property is
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* not specified, the connection must contain an #NMSettingWired setting
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* with a #NMSettingWired:mac-address property.
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*
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* Since: 1.6
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**/
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_nm_setting_property_define_direct_string(properties_override,
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obj_properties,
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NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT,
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PROP_PARENT,
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NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE,
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NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
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parent);
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/**
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* NMSettingMacsec:mode:
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*
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* Specifies how the CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MKA (MACsec Key
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* Agreement) is obtained.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_int32(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE,
|
|
PROP_MODE,
|
|
G_MININT32,
|
|
G_MAXINT32,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
mode);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:encrypt:
|
|
*
|
|
* Whether the transmitted traffic must be encrypted.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_boolean(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_ENCRYPT,
|
|
PROP_ENCRYPT,
|
|
TRUE,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
encrypt);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak:
|
|
*
|
|
* The pre-shared CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MACsec
|
|
* Key Agreement. Must be a string of 32 hexadecimal characters.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_string(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK,
|
|
PROP_MKA_CAK,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
mka_cak);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak-flags:
|
|
*
|
|
* Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
|
|
* property.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_secret_flags(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
|
|
PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
mka_cak_flags);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn:
|
|
*
|
|
* The pre-shared CKN (Connectivity-association Key Name) for
|
|
* MACsec Key Agreement. Must be a string of hexadecimal characters
|
|
* with a even length between 2 and 64.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_string(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN,
|
|
PROP_MKA_CKN,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
mka_ckn);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:port:
|
|
*
|
|
* The port component of the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier), between 1 and 65534.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_int32(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT,
|
|
PROP_PORT,
|
|
1,
|
|
65534,
|
|
1,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
port);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:validation:
|
|
*
|
|
* Specifies the validation mode for incoming frames.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.6
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_int32(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION,
|
|
PROP_VALIDATION,
|
|
G_MININT32,
|
|
G_MAXINT32,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
validation);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* NMSettingMacsec:send-sci:
|
|
*
|
|
* Specifies whether the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier) is included
|
|
* in every packet.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since: 1.12
|
|
**/
|
|
_nm_setting_property_define_direct_boolean(properties_override,
|
|
obj_properties,
|
|
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SEND_SCI,
|
|
PROP_SEND_SCI,
|
|
TRUE,
|
|
NM_SETTING_PARAM_NONE,
|
|
NMSettingMacsecPrivate,
|
|
send_sci);
|
|
|
|
g_object_class_install_properties(object_class, _PROPERTY_ENUMS_LAST, obj_properties);
|
|
|
|
_nm_setting_class_commit(setting_class,
|
|
NM_META_SETTING_TYPE_MACSEC,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
properties_override,
|
|
G_STRUCT_OFFSET(NMSettingMacsec, _priv));
|
|
}
|