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The purpose is to clear the entire available buffer, not only up to the first '\0'. This is done, because otherwise we might leak sensitive data that happens to be after the first '\0', or we might give away the length of the secrets. Of course, those are very (very) minor concerns. But avoiding them is easy enough.
178 lines
4.2 KiB
C
178 lines
4.2 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2015 - 2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
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*/
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#include "nm-default.h"
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#include "nm-secret-utils.h"
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#include <malloc.h>
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/*****************************************************************************/
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void
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nm_explicit_bzero (void *s, gsize n)
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{
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/* gracefully handle n == 0. This is important, callers rely on it. */
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if (n == 0)
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return;
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nm_assert (s);
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#if defined (HAVE_DECL_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_EXPLICIT_BZERO
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explicit_bzero (s, n);
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#else
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{
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volatile guint8 *p = s;
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memset (s, '\0', n);
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while (n-- > 0)
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*(p++) = '\0';
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}
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#endif
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}
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void
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nm_free_secret (char *secret)
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{
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gsize len;
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if (!secret)
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return;
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#if GLIB_CHECK_VERSION(2,44,0)
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/* Here we mix malloc() and g_malloc() API. Usually we avoid this,
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* however since glib 2.44.0 we are in fact guaranteed that g_malloc()/g_free()
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* just wraps malloc()/free(), so this is actually fine.
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*
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* See https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/commit/3be6ed60aa58095691bd697344765e715a327fc1
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*/
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len = malloc_usable_size (secret);
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#else
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len = strlen (secret);
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#endif
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nm_explicit_bzero (secret, len);
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g_free (secret);
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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char *
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nm_secret_strchomp (char *secret)
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{
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gsize len;
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g_return_val_if_fail (secret, NULL);
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/* it's actually identical to g_strchomp(). However,
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* the glib function does not document, that it clears the
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* memory. For @secret, we don't only want to truncate trailing
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* spaces, we want to overwrite them with NUL. */
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len = strlen (secret);
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while (len--) {
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if (g_ascii_isspace ((guchar) secret[len]))
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secret[len] = '\0';
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else
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break;
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}
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return secret;
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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GBytes *
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nm_secret_copy_to_gbytes (gconstpointer mem, gsize mem_len)
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{
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NMSecretBuf *b;
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if (mem_len == 0)
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return g_bytes_new_static ("", 0);
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nm_assert (mem);
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/* NUL terminate the buffer.
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*
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* The entire buffer is already malloc'ed and likely has some room for padding.
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* Thus, in many situations, this additional byte will cause no overhead in
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* practice.
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*
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* Even if it causes an overhead, do it just for safety. Yes, the returned
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* bytes is not a NUL terminated string and no user must rely on this. Do
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* not treat binary data as NUL terminated strings, unless you know what
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* you are doing. Anyway, defensive FTW.
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*/
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b = nm_secret_buf_new (mem_len + 1);
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memcpy (b->bin, mem, mem_len);
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b->bin[mem_len] = 0;
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return nm_secret_buf_to_gbytes_take (b, mem_len);
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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NMSecretBuf *
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nm_secret_buf_new (gsize len)
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{
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NMSecretBuf *secret;
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nm_assert (len > 0);
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secret = g_malloc (sizeof (NMSecretBuf) + len);
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*((gsize *) &(secret->len)) = len;
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return secret;
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}
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static void
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_secret_buf_free (gpointer user_data)
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{
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NMSecretBuf *secret = user_data;
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nm_assert (secret);
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nm_assert (secret->len > 0);
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nm_explicit_bzero (secret->bin, secret->len);
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g_free (user_data);
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}
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GBytes *
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nm_secret_buf_to_gbytes_take (NMSecretBuf *secret, gssize actual_len)
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{
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nm_assert (secret);
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nm_assert (secret->len > 0);
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nm_assert (actual_len == -1 || (actual_len >= 0 && actual_len <= secret->len));
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return g_bytes_new_with_free_func (secret->bin,
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actual_len >= 0 ? (gsize) actual_len : secret->len,
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_secret_buf_free,
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secret);
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}
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/*****************************************************************************/
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/**
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* nm_utils_memeqzero_secret:
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* @data: the data pointer to check (may be %NULL if @length is zero).
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* @length: the number of bytes to check.
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*
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* Checks that all bytes are zero. This always takes the same amount
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* of time to prevent timing attacks.
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*
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* Returns: whether all bytes are zero.
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*/
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gboolean
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nm_utils_memeqzero_secret (gconstpointer data, gsize length)
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{
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const guint8 *const key = data;
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volatile guint8 acc = 0;
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gsize i;
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for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
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acc |= key[i];
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asm volatile("" : "=r"(acc) : "0"(acc));
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}
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return 1 & ((acc - 1) >> 8);
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}
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