/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ #include "nm-sd-adapt-shared.h" #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H # include #endif #if USE_SYS_RANDOM_H # include #else # include #endif #include "alloc-util.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "io-util.h" #include "missing.h" #include "random-util.h" #include "siphash24.h" #include "time-util.h" int rdrand(unsigned long *ret) { #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) static int have_rdrand = -1; unsigned long v; uint8_t success; if (have_rdrand < 0) { uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx; /* Check if RDRAND is supported by the CPU */ if (__get_cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx) == 0) { have_rdrand = false; return -EOPNOTSUPP; } /* Compat with old gcc where bit_RDRND didn't exist yet */ #ifndef bit_RDRND #define bit_RDRND (1U << 30) #endif have_rdrand = !!(ecx & bit_RDRND); } if (have_rdrand == 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; asm volatile("rdrand %0;" "setc %1" : "=r" (v), "=qm" (success)); msan_unpoison(&success, sizeof(success)); if (!success) return -EAGAIN; /* Apparently on some AMD CPUs RDRAND will sometimes (after a suspend/resume cycle?) report success * via the carry flag but nonetheless return the same fixed value -1 in all cases. This appears to be * a bad bug in the CPU or firmware. Let's deal with that and work-around this by explicitly checking * for this special value (and also 0, just to be sure) and filtering it out. This is a work-around * only however and something AMD really should fix properly. The Linux kernel should probably work * around this issue by turning off RDRAND altogether on those CPUs. See: * https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/11810 */ if (v == 0 || v == ULONG_MAX) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), "RDRAND returned suspicious value %lx, assuming bad hardware RNG, not using value.", v); *ret = v; return 0; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } int genuine_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n, RandomFlags flags) { static int have_syscall = -1; _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; bool got_some = false; int r; /* Gathers some randomness from the kernel (or the CPU if the RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND flag is set). This * call won't block, unless the RANDOM_BLOCK flag is set. If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, an error is * returned if the random pool is not initialized. Otherwise it will always return some data from the * kernel, regardless of whether the random pool is fully initialized or not. */ if (n == 0) return 0; if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND)) /* Try x86-64' RDRAND intrinsic if we have it. We only use it if high quality randomness is * not required, as we don't trust it (who does?). Note that we only do a single iteration of * RDRAND here, even though the Intel docs suggest calling this in a tight loop of 10 * invocations or so. That's because we don't really care about the quality here. We * generally prefer using RDRAND if the caller allows us to, since this way we won't upset * the kernel's random subsystem by accessing it before the pool is initialized (after all it * will kmsg log about every attempt to do so)..*/ for (;;) { unsigned long u; size_t m; if (rdrand(&u) < 0) { if (got_some && FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) { /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudo-random values */ pseudo_random_bytes(p, n); return 0; } /* OK, this didn't work, let's go to getrandom() + /dev/urandom instead */ break; } m = MIN(sizeof(u), n); memcpy(p, &u, m); p = (uint8_t*) p + m; n -= m; if (n == 0) return 0; /* Yay, success! */ got_some = true; } /* Use the getrandom() syscall unless we know we don't have it. */ if (have_syscall != 0 && !HAS_FEATURE_MEMORY_SANITIZER) { for (;;) { #if !HAVE_GETRANDOM /* NetworkManager Note: systemd calls the syscall directly in this case. Don't add that workaround. * If you don't compile against a libc that provides getrandom(), you don't get it. */ r = -1; errno = ENOSYS; #else r = getrandom(p, n, FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_BLOCK) ? 0 : GRND_NONBLOCK); #endif if (r > 0) { have_syscall = true; if ((size_t) r == n) return 0; /* Yay, success! */ assert((size_t) r < n); p = (uint8_t*) p + r; n -= r; if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) { /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudo-random values */ pseudo_random_bytes(p, n); return 0; } got_some = true; /* Hmm, we didn't get enough good data but the caller insists on good data? Then try again */ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_BLOCK)) continue; /* Fill in the rest with /dev/urandom */ break; } else if (r == 0) { have_syscall = true; return -EIO; } else if (errno == ENOSYS) { /* We lack the syscall, continue with reading from /dev/urandom. */ have_syscall = false; break; } else if (errno == EAGAIN) { /* The kernel has no entropy whatsoever. Let's remember to use the syscall * the next time again though. * * If RANDOM_MAY_FAIL is set, return an error so that random_bytes() can * produce some pseudo-random bytes instead. Otherwise, fall back to * /dev/urandom, which we know is empty, but the kernel will produce some * bytes for us on a best-effort basis. */ have_syscall = true; if (got_some && FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO)) { /* Fill in the remaining bytes using pseudorandom values */ pseudo_random_bytes(p, n); return 0; } if (FLAGS_SET(flags, RANDOM_MAY_FAIL)) return -ENODATA; /* Use /dev/urandom instead */ break; } else return -errno; } } fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY); if (fd < 0) return errno == ENOENT ? -ENOSYS : -errno; return loop_read_exact(fd, p, n, true); } void initialize_srand(void) { static bool srand_called = false; unsigned x; #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H const void *auxv; #endif unsigned long k; if (srand_called) return; #if HAVE_SYS_AUXV_H /* The kernel provides us with 16 bytes of entropy in auxv, so let's try to make use of that to seed * the pseudo-random generator. It's better than nothing... But let's first hash it to make it harder * to recover the original value by watching any pseudo-random bits we generate. After all the * AT_RANDOM data might be used by other stuff too (in particular: ASLR), and we probably shouldn't * leak the seed for that. */ auxv = ULONG_TO_PTR(getauxval(AT_RANDOM)); if (auxv) { static const uint8_t auxval_hash_key[16] = { 0x92, 0x6e, 0xfe, 0x1b, 0xcf, 0x00, 0x52, 0x9c, 0xcc, 0x42, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x81, 0x0f }; x = (unsigned) siphash24(auxv, 16, auxval_hash_key); } else #endif x = 0; x ^= (unsigned) now(CLOCK_REALTIME); x ^= (unsigned) gettid(); if (rdrand(&k) >= 0) x ^= (unsigned) k; srand(x); srand_called = true; } /* INT_MAX gives us only 31 bits, so use 24 out of that. */ #if RAND_MAX >= INT_MAX # define RAND_STEP 3 #else /* SHORT_INT_MAX or lower gives at most 15 bits, we just just 8 out of that. */ # define RAND_STEP 1 #endif void pseudo_random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) { uint8_t *q; initialize_srand(); for (q = p; q < (uint8_t*) p + n; q += RAND_STEP) { unsigned rr; rr = (unsigned) rand(); #if RAND_STEP >= 3 if ((size_t) (q - (uint8_t*) p + 2) < n) q[2] = rr >> 16; #endif #if RAND_STEP >= 2 if ((size_t) (q - (uint8_t*) p + 1) < n) q[1] = rr >> 8; #endif q[0] = rr; } } void random_bytes(void *p, size_t n) { if (genuine_random_bytes(p, n, RANDOM_EXTEND_WITH_PSEUDO|RANDOM_MAY_FAIL|RANDOM_ALLOW_RDRAND) >= 0) return; /* If for some reason some user made /dev/urandom unavailable to us, or the kernel has no entropy, use a PRNG instead. */ pseudo_random_bytes(p, n); }