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https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/NetworkManager/NetworkManager.git
synced 2026-05-06 07:58:00 +02:00
platform/netlink: add reading NETLINK_PKTINFO in nl_recv()
We will need this, for getting nl_pktinfo control messages that contain the extended destination group number. Also, drop NL_SOCK_PASSCRED. It was only used to not iterate over the control messages, but doing that should be cheap.
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Haller
parent
39320e26cd
commit
51b707357d
3 changed files with 69 additions and 45 deletions
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@ -9211,7 +9211,9 @@ _netlink_recv(NMPlatform *platform,
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nla,
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&buf,
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out_creds,
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out_creds_has);
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out_creds_has,
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NULL,
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NULL);
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nm_assert((n <= 0 && !buf)
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|| (n > 0 && n <= priv->netlink_recv_buf.len && buf == priv->netlink_recv_buf.buf));
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@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
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} \
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G_STMT_END
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#define NL_SOCK_PASSCRED (1 << 1)
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#define NL_MSG_PEEK (1 << 3)
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#define NL_MSG_PEEK_EXPLICIT (1 << 4)
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#define NL_NO_AUTO_ACK (1 << 5)
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@ -933,12 +932,19 @@ nl_socket_set_passcred(struct nl_sock *sk, int state)
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err = setsockopt(sk->s_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &state, sizeof(state));
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if (err < 0)
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return -nm_errno_from_native(errno);
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return 0;
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}
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if (state)
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sk->s_flags |= NL_SOCK_PASSCRED;
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else
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sk->s_flags &= ~NL_SOCK_PASSCRED;
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int
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nl_socket_set_pktinfo(struct nl_sock *sk, int state)
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{
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int err;
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nm_assert_sk(sk);
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err = setsockopt(sk->s_fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_PKTINFO, &state, sizeof(state));
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if (err < 0)
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return -nm_errno_from_native(errno);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -1182,7 +1188,7 @@ nl_recvmsgs(struct nl_sock *sk, const struct nl_cb *cb)
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gboolean creds_has;
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continue_reading:
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n = nl_recv(sk, NULL, 0, &nla, &buf, &creds, &creds_has);
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n = nl_recv(sk, NULL, 0, &nla, &buf, &creds, &creds_has, NULL, NULL);
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if (n <= 0)
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return n;
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@ -1419,6 +1425,10 @@ nl_send_auto(struct nl_sock *sk, struct nl_msg *msg)
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* on success.
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* @out_creds_has: (out) (allow-none): result indicating whether
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* @out_creds was filled.
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* @out_pktinfo_group: (out) (allow-none): optional out buffer for NETLINK_PKTINFO
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* group on success.
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* @out_pktinfo_has: (out) (allow-none): result indicating whether
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* @out_pktinfo_group was filled.
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*
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* If @buf0_len is zero, the function will g_malloc() a new receive buffer of size
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* nl_socket_get_msg_buf_size(). If @buf0_len is larger than zero, then @buf0
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@ -1441,18 +1451,20 @@ nl_recv(struct nl_sock *sk,
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struct sockaddr_nl *nla,
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unsigned char **buf,
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struct ucred *out_creds,
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gboolean *out_creds_has)
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gboolean *out_creds_has,
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uint32_t *out_pktinfo_group,
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gboolean *out_pktinfo_has)
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{
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/* We really expect msg_contol_buf to be large enough and MSG_CTRUNC not
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* happening. We nm_assert() against that. However, in release builds
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* we don't assert, so add some extra safety space for the unexpected
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* case where we might need more than CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)).
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* It should not hurt and should not be necessary. It's just some
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* extra defensive space. */
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#define _MSG_CONTROL_BUF_EXTRA_SPACE (NM_MORE_ASSERTS ? 512u : 0u)
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union {
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struct cmsghdr cmsghdr;
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char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) + _MSG_CONTROL_BUF_EXTRA_SPACE];
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struct cmsghdr _dummy_for_alignment;
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struct {
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char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) + CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct nl_pktinfo))];
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/* We really expect that "buf" is large enough end even assert against
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* that. We don't expect and don't want to handle MSG_CTRUNC error.
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* Still, add some extra safety. This is on the stack and essentially for free. */
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char _extra[512];
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};
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} msg_contol_buf;
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ssize_t n;
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int flags = 0;
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@ -1465,14 +1477,14 @@ nl_recv(struct nl_sock *sk,
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.msg_controllen = 0,
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.msg_control = NULL,
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};
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struct ucred tmpcreds;
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gboolean tmpcreds_has = FALSE;
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int retval;
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int errsv;
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
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int retval;
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int errsv;
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nm_assert(nla);
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nm_assert(buf && !*buf);
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nm_assert(!out_creds_has == !out_creds);
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nm_assert(!out_creds_has || out_creds);
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nm_assert(!out_pktinfo_has || out_pktinfo_group);
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if ((sk->s_flags & NL_MSG_PEEK)
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|| (!(sk->s_flags & NL_MSG_PEEK_EXPLICIT) && sk->s_bufsize == 0))
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@ -1486,7 +1498,7 @@ nl_recv(struct nl_sock *sk,
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iov.iov_base = g_malloc(iov.iov_len);
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}
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if (out_creds && (sk->s_flags & NL_SOCK_PASSCRED)) {
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if (out_creds_has || out_pktinfo_has) {
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msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(msg_contol_buf);
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msg.msg_control = msg_contol_buf.buf;
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}
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@ -1506,11 +1518,14 @@ retry:
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goto abort;
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}
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nm_assert((gsize) n <= G_MAXINT);
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/* We really don't expect truncation of ancillary data. We provided a large
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* enough buffer, so this is likely a bug. In the worst case, we might lack
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* the requested credentials and the caller likely will reject the message
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* later. */
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nm_assert(!(msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC));
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nm_assert(msg.msg_controllen <= G_STRUCT_OFFSET(typeof(msg_contol_buf), _extra));
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if (iov.iov_len < n || (msg.msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
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/* respond with error to an incomplete message */
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@ -1539,32 +1554,35 @@ retry:
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goto abort;
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}
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if (out_creds && (sk->s_flags & NL_SOCK_PASSCRED)) {
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struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
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if (out_creds_has || out_pktinfo_has) {
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NM_SET_OUT(out_creds_has, FALSE);
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NM_SET_OUT(out_pktinfo_has, FALSE);
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for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) {
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if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET)
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continue;
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if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDENTIALS)
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continue;
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memcpy(&tmpcreds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(tmpcreds));
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tmpcreds_has = TRUE;
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break;
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switch (cmsg->cmsg_level) {
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case SOL_SOCKET:
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if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS && out_creds_has) {
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memcpy(out_creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(*out_creds));
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*out_creds_has = TRUE;
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}
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break;
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case SOL_NETLINK:
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if (cmsg->cmsg_type == NETLINK_PKTINFO && out_pktinfo_has) {
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struct nl_pktinfo p;
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memcpy(&p, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(p));
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*out_pktinfo_group = p.group;
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*out_pktinfo_has = TRUE;
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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retval = n;
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*buf = iov.iov_base;
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return (int) n;
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abort:
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if (retval <= 0) {
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if (iov.iov_base != buf0)
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g_free(iov.iov_base);
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return retval;
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}
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*buf = iov.iov_base;
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if (out_creds && tmpcreds_has)
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*out_creds = tmpcreds;
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NM_SET_OUT(out_creds_has, tmpcreds_has);
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if (iov.iov_base != buf0)
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g_free(iov.iov_base);
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return retval;
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}
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@ -528,6 +528,8 @@ int nl_socket_set_buffer_size(struct nl_sock *sk, int rxbuf, int txbuf);
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int nl_socket_set_passcred(struct nl_sock *sk, int state);
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int nl_socket_set_pktinfo(struct nl_sock *sk, int state);
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int nl_socket_set_nonblocking(const struct nl_sock *sk);
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void nl_socket_disable_msg_peek(struct nl_sock *sk);
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@ -544,7 +546,9 @@ int nl_recv(struct nl_sock *sk,
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struct sockaddr_nl *nla,
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unsigned char **buf,
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struct ucred *out_creds,
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gboolean *out_creds_has);
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gboolean *out_creds_has,
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uint32_t *out_pktinfo_group,
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gboolean *out_pktinfo_has);
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int nl_send(struct nl_sock *sk, struct nl_msg *msg);
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