NetworkManager/libnm-core/nm-setting-macsec.c

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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: t; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the
* Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
* Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*
* Copyright 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
#include "nm-default.h"
#include "nm-setting-macsec.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "nm-utils.h"
#include "nm-core-types-internal.h"
#include "nm-setting-connection.h"
#include "nm-setting-private.h"
#include "nm-setting-wired.h"
#include "nm-connection-private.h"
/**
* SECTION:nm-setting-macsec
* @short_description: Describes connection properties for MACSEC interfaces
*
* The #NMSettingMacsec object is a #NMSetting subclass that describes properties
* necessary for connection to MACsec (IEEE 802.1AE) interfaces.
**/
libnm: use NMMetaSettingInfo for tracking setting priority Previously, each (non abstract) NMSetting class had to register its name and priority via _nm_register_setting(). Note, that libnm-core.la already links against "nm-meta-setting.c", which also redundantly keeps track of the settings name and gtype as well. Re-use NMMetaSettingInfo also in libnm-core.la, to track this meta data. The goal is to get rid of private data structures that track meta data about NMSetting classes. In this case, "registered_settings" hash. Instead, we should have one place where all this meta data is tracked. This was, it is also accessible as internal API, which can be useful (for keyfile). Note that NMSettingClass has some overlap with NMMetaSettingInfo. One difference is, that NMMetaSettingInfo is const, while NMSettingClass is only initialized during the class_init() method. Appart from that, it's mostly a matter of taste, whether we attach meta data to NMSettingClass, to NMMetaSettingInfo, or to a static-array indexed by NMMetaSettingType. Note, that previously, _nm_register_setting() was private API. That means, no user could subclass a functioning NMSetting instance. The same is still true: NMMetaSettingInfo is internal API and users cannot access it to create their own NMSetting subclasses. But that is almost desired. libnm is not designed, to be extensible via subclassing, nor is it clear why that would be a useful thing to do. One day, we should remove the NMSetting and NMSettingClass definitions from public headers. Their only use is subclassing the types, which however does not work. While libnm-core was linking already against nm-meta-setting.c, nm_meta_setting_infos was unreferenced. So, this change increases the binary size of libnm and NetworkManager (1032 bytes). Note however that roughly the same information was previously allocated at runtime.
2018-07-27 14:08:14 +02:00
G_DEFINE_TYPE (NMSettingMacsec, nm_setting_macsec, NM_TYPE_SETTING)
#define NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE(o) (G_TYPE_INSTANCE_GET_PRIVATE ((o), NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NMSettingMacsecPrivate))
typedef struct {
char *parent;
NMSettingMacsecMode mode;
bool encrypt:1;
bool send_sci:1;
char *mka_cak;
NMSettingSecretFlags mka_cak_flags;
char *mka_ckn;
int port;
NMSettingMacsecValidation validation;
} NMSettingMacsecPrivate;
NM_GOBJECT_PROPERTIES_DEFINE_BASE (
PROP_PARENT,
PROP_MODE,
PROP_ENCRYPT,
PROP_MKA_CAK,
PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS,
PROP_MKA_CKN,
PROP_PORT,
PROP_VALIDATION,
PROP_SEND_SCI,
);
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_new:
*
* Creates a new #NMSettingMacsec object with default values.
*
* Returns: (transfer full): the new empty #NMSettingMacsec object
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSetting *
nm_setting_macsec_new (void)
{
return (NMSetting *) g_object_new (NM_TYPE_SETTING_MACSEC, NULL);
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_parent:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:parent property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_parent (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->parent;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mode:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mode property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingMacsecMode
nm_setting_macsec_get_mode (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->mode;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:encrypt property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
gboolean
nm_setting_macsec_get_encrypt (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), TRUE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->encrypt;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->mka_cak;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingSecretFlags pertaining to the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingSecretFlags
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_cak_flags (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->mka_cak_flags;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
const char *
nm_setting_macsec_get_mka_ckn (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NULL);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->mka_ckn;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_port:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:port property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
int
nm_setting_macsec_get_port (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), 1);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->port;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_validation:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:validation property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
NMSettingMacsecValidation
nm_setting_macsec_get_validation (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_DISABLE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->validation;
}
/**
* nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci:
* @setting: the #NMSettingMacsec
*
* Returns: the #NMSettingMacsec:send-sci property of the setting
*
* Since: 1.12
**/
gboolean
nm_setting_macsec_get_send_sci (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_SETTING_MACSEC (setting), TRUE);
return NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting)->send_sci;
}
static GPtrArray *
need_secrets (NMSetting *setting)
{
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
GPtrArray *secrets = NULL;
if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
if ( !priv->mka_cak
&& !NM_FLAGS_HAS (priv->mka_cak_flags, NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NOT_REQUIRED)) {
secrets = g_ptr_array_sized_new (1);
g_ptr_array_add (secrets, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK);
}
}
return secrets;
}
/*********************************************************************/
static gboolean
verify_macsec_key (const char *key, gboolean cak, GError **error)
{
int req_len;
if (!key || !key[0]) {
g_set_error_literal (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key is empty"));
return FALSE;
}
req_len = cak ?
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_LENGTH :
NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN_LENGTH;
if (strlen (key) != req_len) {
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key must be %d characters"), req_len);
return FALSE;
}
if (!NM_STRCHAR_ALL (key, ch, g_ascii_isxdigit (ch))) {
g_set_error_literal (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("the key contains non-hexadecimal characters"));
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean
verify (NMSetting *setting, NMConnection *connection, GError **error)
{
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
NMSettingConnection *s_con = NULL;
NMSettingWired *s_wired = NULL;
NMSetting8021x *s_8021x = NULL;
if (connection) {
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection);
s_wired = nm_connection_get_setting_wired (connection);
s_8021x = nm_connection_get_setting_802_1x (connection);
}
if (priv->parent) {
if (nm_utils_is_uuid (priv->parent)) {
/* If we have an NMSettingConnection:master with slave-type="macsec",
* then it must be the same UUID.
*/
if (s_con) {
const char *master = NULL, *slave_type = NULL;
slave_type = nm_setting_connection_get_slave_type (s_con);
if (!g_strcmp0 (slave_type, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME))
master = nm_setting_connection_get_master (s_con);
if (master && g_strcmp0 (priv->parent, master) != 0) {
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("'%s' value doesn't match '%s=%s'"),
priv->parent, NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_MASTER, master);
g_prefix_error (error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
}
} else if (!nm_utils_iface_valid_name (priv->parent)) {
/* parent must be either a UUID or an interface name */
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_INVALID_PROPERTY,
_("'%s' is neither an UUID nor an interface name"),
priv->parent);
g_prefix_error (error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
} else {
/* If parent is NULL, the parent must be specified via
* NMSettingWired:mac-address.
*/
if ( connection
&& (!s_wired || !nm_setting_wired_get_mac_address (s_wired))) {
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
_("property is not specified and neither is '%s:%s'"),
NM_SETTING_WIRED_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_WIRED_MAC_ADDRESS);
g_prefix_error (error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK) {
if (!verify_macsec_key (priv->mka_ckn, FALSE, error)) {
g_prefix_error (error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN);
return FALSE;
}
} else if (priv->mode == NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_EAP) {
if (!s_8021x) {
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_SETTING,
_("EAP key management requires '%s' setting presence"),
NM_SETTING_802_1X_SETTING_NAME);
g_prefix_error (error, "%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (priv->port <= 0 || priv->port > 65534) {
g_set_error (error,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR,
NM_CONNECTION_ERROR_MISSING_PROPERTY,
_("invalid port %d"),
priv->port);
g_prefix_error (error, "%s.%s: ", NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SETTING_NAME, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
static void
nm_setting_macsec_init (NMSettingMacsec *setting)
{
}
static void
set_property (GObject *object, guint prop_id,
const GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
{
NMSettingMacsec *setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC (object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
switch (prop_id) {
case PROP_PARENT:
g_free (priv->parent);
priv->parent = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
case PROP_MODE:
priv->mode = g_value_get_int (value);
break;
case PROP_ENCRYPT:
priv->encrypt = g_value_get_boolean (value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK:
g_free (priv->mka_cak);
priv->mka_cak = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
priv->mka_cak_flags = g_value_get_flags (value);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CKN:
g_free (priv->mka_ckn);
priv->mka_ckn = g_value_dup_string (value);
break;
case PROP_PORT:
priv->port = g_value_get_int (value);
break;
case PROP_VALIDATION:
priv->validation = g_value_get_int (value);
break;
case PROP_SEND_SCI:
priv->send_sci = g_value_get_boolean (value);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
static void
get_property (GObject *object, guint prop_id,
GValue *value, GParamSpec *pspec)
{
NMSettingMacsec *setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC (object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
switch (prop_id) {
case PROP_PARENT:
g_value_set_string (value, priv->parent);
break;
case PROP_MODE:
g_value_set_int (value, priv->mode);
break;
case PROP_ENCRYPT:
g_value_set_boolean (value, priv->encrypt);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK:
g_value_set_string (value, priv->mka_cak);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS:
g_value_set_flags (value, priv->mka_cak_flags);
break;
case PROP_MKA_CKN:
g_value_set_string (value, priv->mka_ckn);
break;
case PROP_PORT:
g_value_set_int (value, priv->port);
break;
case PROP_VALIDATION:
g_value_set_int (value, priv->validation);
break;
case PROP_SEND_SCI:
g_value_set_boolean (value, priv->send_sci);
break;
default:
G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
break;
}
}
static void
finalize (GObject *object)
{
NMSettingMacsec *setting = NM_SETTING_MACSEC (object);
NMSettingMacsecPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_MACSEC_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
g_free (priv->parent);
if (priv->mka_cak) {
memset (priv->mka_cak, 0, strlen (priv->mka_cak));
g_free (priv->mka_cak);
}
g_free (priv->mka_ckn);
G_OBJECT_CLASS (nm_setting_macsec_parent_class)->finalize (object);
}
static void
nm_setting_macsec_class_init (NMSettingMacsecClass *klass)
{
GObjectClass *object_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS (klass);
NMSettingClass *setting_class = NM_SETTING_CLASS (klass);
g_type_class_add_private (klass, sizeof (NMSettingMacsecPrivate));
object_class->set_property = set_property;
object_class->get_property = get_property;
object_class->finalize = finalize;
setting_class->verify = verify;
setting_class->need_secrets = need_secrets;
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:parent:
*
* If given, specifies the parent interface name or parent connection UUID
* from which this MACSEC interface should be created. If this property is
* not specified, the connection must contain an #NMSettingWired setting
* with a #NMSettingWired:mac-address property.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_PARENT] =
g_param_spec_string (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PARENT, "", "",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mode:
*
* Specifies how the CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MKA (MACsec Key
* Agreement) is obtained.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MODE] =
g_param_spec_int (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE, "", "",
G_MININT, G_MAXINT, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MODE_PSK,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:encrypt:
*
* Whether the transmitted traffic must be encrypted.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_ENCRYPT] =
g_param_spec_boolean (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_ENCRYPT, "", "",
TRUE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak:
*
* The pre-shared CAK (Connectivity Association Key) for MACsec
* Key Agreement.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK] =
g_param_spec_string (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK, "", "",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
NM_SETTING_PARAM_SECRET |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak-flags:
*
* Flags indicating how to handle the #NMSettingMacsec:mka-cak
* property.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CAK_FLAGS] =
g_param_spec_flags (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CAK_FLAGS, "", "",
NM_TYPE_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS,
NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAG_NONE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:mka-ckn:
*
* The pre-shared CKN (Connectivity-association Key Name) for
* MACsec Key Agreement.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_MKA_CKN] =
g_param_spec_string (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_MKA_CKN, "", "",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:port:
*
* The port component of the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier), between 1 and 65534.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_PORT] =
g_param_spec_int (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_PORT, "", "",
1, 65534, 1,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:validation:
*
* Specifies the validation mode for incoming frames.
*
* Since: 1.6
**/
obj_properties[PROP_VALIDATION] =
g_param_spec_int (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION, "", "",
G_MININT, G_MAXINT, NM_SETTING_MACSEC_VALIDATION_STRICT,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
NM_SETTING_PARAM_INFERRABLE |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
/**
* NMSettingMacsec:send-sci:
*
* Specifies whether the SCI (Secure Channel Identifier) is included
* in every packet.
*
* Since: 1.12
**/
obj_properties[PROP_SEND_SCI] =
g_param_spec_boolean (NM_SETTING_MACSEC_SEND_SCI, "", "",
TRUE,
G_PARAM_READWRITE |
G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
g_object_class_install_properties (object_class, _PROPERTY_ENUMS_LAST, obj_properties);
libnm: rework setting metadata for property handling NMSetting internally already tracked a list of all proper GObject properties and D-Bus-only properties. Rework the tracking of the list, so that: - instead of attaching the data to the GType of the setting via g_type_set_qdata(), it is tracked in a static array indexed by NMMetaSettingType. This allows to find the setting-data by simple pointer arithmetic, instead of taking a look and iterating (like g_type_set_qdata() does). Note, that this is still thread safe, because the static table entry is initialized in the class-init function with _nm_setting_class_commit(). And it only accessed by following a NMSettingClass instance, thus the class constructor already ran (maybe not for all setting classes, but for the particular one that we look up). I think this makes initialization of the metadata simpler to understand. Previously, in a first phase each class would attach the metadata to the GType as setting_property_overrides_quark(). Then during nm_setting_class_ensure_properties() it would merge them and set as setting_properties_quark(). Now, during the first phase, we only incrementally build a properties_override GArray, which we finally hand over during nm_setting_class_commit(). - sort the property infos by name and do binary search. Also expose this meta data types as internal API in nm-setting-private.h. While not accessed yet, it can prove beneficial, to have direct (internal) access to these structures. Also, rename NMSettingProperty to NMSettInfoProperty to use a distinct naming scheme. We already have 40+ subclasses of NMSetting that are called NMSetting*. Likewise, NMMetaSetting* is heavily used already. So, choose a new, distinct name.
2018-07-28 15:26:03 +02:00
_nm_setting_class_commit (setting_class, NM_META_SETTING_TYPE_MACSEC);
}